ai_security▌

2026-11-20

4 item(s) verified and swept on 2026-11-20, each citing a primary source.

NOTABLERED-TEAM

Research shows Chrome's embedded Gemini Nano can be driven as a post-exploitation engine

Researchers show Chrome's browser-embedded Gemini Nano can be operated from the host using only stock OS interpreters, with the one-time user-activation check before the model download satisfied by a simulated click or bypassed entirely. They combine its multimodal capabilities into a simulated cyber operation - identifying credentials and email PII, classifying images, calling custom tools, reading a password from a webcam image and unlocking an encrypted archive - presenting the signed, monitoring-invisible local model as a living-off-the-land post-exploitation asset.

NOTABLERED-TEAM

BlockJack fault attacks on KV-cache block tables cross tenant boundaries in paged LLM serving

First fault-attack work on the address-translation layer of paged LLM serving (vLLM-style block tables): corrupting block-table entries redirects one request's KV-cache reads to blocks assigned to another tenant without modifying model weights, prompts, or cached state. The paper demonstrates both confidentiality violation (victim content appearing in attacker responses) and integrity violation (attacker-supplied context steering victim answers) on paged serving frameworks.

NOTABLERED-TEAM

Agent-payment signed objects can permit transfers beyond the mandate users approved

Research on agent commerce protocols (x402 stablecoin payments) defines authority closure: the wallet signs an object whose real effects depend on the contracts that consume it, so matching displayed fields or simulating one payment misses transfers the signed object still permits. In 2,130 generated objects and 62,979 execution programs, 265 mandate-violating objects passed both a field-and-expiry check and an address allow-list; the proposed wallet-side Closure checker rejected all 1,680 violating objects it observed in local x402 reference-client tests.

NOTABLERED-TEAMPROMPT-INJECTION

arXiv 2611.23346: state-transfer audit of long-horizon LLM agents locates security failures in the agent harness, not the prompt boundary

Paper (v1 Nov 17, Wednesday announcement batch, first publication): argues critical security and reliability failures in long-horizon agents happen during harness state transfers - a transfer can admit unchecked content (indirect prompt injections, unverified memory writes), rewrite state lossily (context compaction dropping user constraints, memory consolidation stripping source authority) or restore state incompletely (rollbacks leaving aborted state) - and proposes state-transfer auditing and controls beyond prompt/tool-call traces.

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